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SOME EFFECTS OF MORAL INDIGNATION ON LAW
Cass R. Sunstein "t
ABSTRACT

Moral intuitions operate in much the same way as other intuitions do;
what makes the moral domain distinctive is the frequent foundation of
moral judgments in the emotions, beliefs, and response tendencies that
define indignation. The intuitive system of cognition, System 1, is typically
responsible for indignation; the more reflective system, System 2, may or
may not provide an override. An understanding of indignation helps to
explain many phenomena of interest to law and politics: the outrage
heuristic, the severity shift, the puzzling centrality of harm, moral framing,
and the act-omission distinction. The operation of System 1 also helps to
explain moral dumbfounding, understood as intense moral opprobrium that
people are unable to justify, and moral numbness, understood as moral
indifference that people know on reflection to be unwarranted. Both moral
dumbfounding and moral numbness play a significant role in law and
politics. Because of the nature of indignation, it is extremely difficult for
people to achieve coherence in their moral intuitions, and the absence of
coherence appears to be replicated in several areas of law. Legal and
political institutions usually aspire to be deliberative, to check intuitions
that misfire, and to pay close attention to System 2; but even in deliberative
institutions, System 1 can make some compelling demands. A general
implication is that judges may not be aware of the actual causes of their
moral judgments and of the legal conclusions that rely on them.
INTRODUCTION

The psychological analysis of moral sentiments has witnessed
profound changes over the last few decades, from a conception of morality
as a system of abstract rules that can be understood and internalized' to a
view that emphasizes moral emotions and moral intuitions that are not
Felix Frankfurter Professor, Harvard Law School. The Vermont Law Review and the author
note that because Professor Sunstein has joined the Office of Management and Budget in the Obama
Administration, the author was unavailable to approve editorial changes customary to publication. It was
therefore necessary to print the Article with minimal revision. This Article draws on and develops some
of the analysis in Daniel Kahneman & Cass R. Sunstein, Cognitive Psychology of Moral Intuitions, in
NEUROBIOLOGY OF HUMAN VALUES 91 (Jean-Pierre Changeux et al. eds., 2005), and Cass R. Sunstein,
Moral Heuristicsand Moral Framing,88 MINN. L.R. 1556 (2004).
t I am generally grateful to Daniel Kahneman for many years of discussion; he deserves
credit for whatever is valuable in this piece but I am solely to blame for confusion and errors.
1. See Lawrence Kohlberg, Stage and Sequence: The Cognitive-DevelopmentalApproach to
Socialization,in HANDBOOK OF SOCIALIZATION THEORY AND RESEARCH 347 (D.A. Goslin ed., 1969).
*
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anchored in reasons.2 On this view, reasons tend to be ex post
rationalizations for moral intuitions, rather than causal.3 My goals here are
to sketch an analysis of moral intuitions that builds on the new work, to
relate that analysis to a general approach to the study of intuitive thought,
and to connect that approach to a set of issues in politics and law. 4
The central analysis applies to a wide range of moral intuitions, but the
emphasis throughout is on the complex of emotions, beliefs, and response
tendencies that define indignation.5 As we shall see, indignation is
responsible for a number of puzzling practices in politics and law.
Recurring themes are that people's moral judgments are often automatic,
that their automatic responses play a significant role in both legislatures and
in courtrooms, and that it is often valuable but difficult to attempt to
constrain automatic responses by reference to more deliberative processes.
A general conclusion is that people may not be aware of the actual causes of
their indignation and of the legal outcomes that rest on those causes.
It has been suggested that indignation comes in three distinctive
varieties: anger, disgust, and contempt. 6 The main concern here is the
variant of indignation that involves anger. For a mundane example, imagine
2. Joshua D. Greene, The Secret Joke of Kant's Soul, in MORAL PSYCHOLOGY: THE
NEUROSCIENCE OF MORALITY: EMOTION, BRAIN DISORDERS, AND DEVELOPMENT 35, 36 (Walter

Sinnott-Armstrong ed., 2008) [hereinafter Greene, The Secret Joke]; Joshua D. Greene & J.D. Cohen,
For the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing and Everything, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC'Y
LONDON B 1775, 1775 (2004); Joshua D. Greene & Jonathan Haidt, How (And Where) Does Moral
Judgment Work?, 6 TRENDS COGNITIVE Sci. 517, 517 (2002); Jonathan Haidt, The New Synthesis in
Moral Psychology, 316 SCIENCE 998, 998 (2007) [hereinafter Haidt, The New Synthesis]; Jonathan
Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social lntuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment, 108
PSYCHOL. REV. 814, 814 (2001) [hereinafter Haidt, The Emotional Dog]; Paul Rozin et al., The CAD
Triad Hypothesis: A Mapping Between Three Moral Emotions (Contempt, Anger, Disgust) and Three
Moral Codes (Community, Autonomy, and Divinity), 76 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 574, 574 (1999). For
a useful synthesis, distinguishing between reactions to moral transgressions and reactions to moral
dilemmas, see Benoit Monin et al., Deciding Versus Reacting: Conceptions of Moral Judgment and the
Reason-Affect Debate, 11 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 99 (2007).
3. See, e.g., Marc Hauser et al., A DissociationBetween Moral Judgments and Justifications,
22 MIND & LANGUAGE 1, 17 (2007).

4. An illuminating call for an integration of psychology and philosophy can be found in
KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, EXPERIMENTS IN ETHICS 123 (2008). An exploration of related issues can
be found in THE AFFECT EFFECT: DYNAMICS OF EMOTION IN POLITICAL THINKING AND BEHAVIOR (W.

Russell Neuman et al. eds., 2007).
5. Indignation is not, of course, the only such complex relevant to moral psychology. See, for
example, the discussion of disgust in Dan Jones, Moral Psychology: The Depths of Disgust, 447
NATURE 768 (2007). Much of what I shall have to say about System I and System 2 bears on other
pertinent complexes of emotion, beliefs, and response tendencies, including disgust, shame, and hatred.
In my view, however, indignation has a kind of primacy, certainly in the domains of policy and law. For
an interesting study of the different aspects of the brain that are triggered by disgust and indignation, see
Jorge Moll et al., The Moral Affiliations of Disgust: A FunctionalMR! Study, 18 COGNITIVE & BEHAV.
NEUROLOGY 68 (2005).

6. Rozin et al., supra note 2, at 575.
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that you see a bully beat up a weakling without any provocation. You will
respond with indignation. Like other intentional states, indignation can be
explained in two quite different ways: by referring to reasons, or by
invoking psychological causes. As you see the bully assaulting his victim,
you are likely to be aware of a reason for your emotion: the action violates
an accepted (and in your view justified) social rule that prohibits
unprovoked aggression. The categorization of the action provides a reason
for indignation, a reason that the observer expects other objective observers
to endorse. Classical analyses of moral development were much concerned
with people's ability to marshal reasons for their judgments; the reasons
were often understood as causing those judgments.7
The view that has gained currency in recent years is quite different.8 In
this view, indignation is like a fear of spiders. One does not fear spiders
because they are dangerous-one just fears them. Because people tend to
attribute their reactions to the objects that evoke these reactions, the feared
spider is perceived as a dangerous spider. However, the perception of
dangerousness is not the reason for the fear or even its cause; both the fear
and the perception are symptoms of an uncontrolled reaction to spiders.
Many people who are afraid of spiders know that their fear is objectively
groundless and lacks a reason. The equivalent state in the moral domain has
been described as "moral dumbfounding": the experience of intense moral
reactions, sometimes producing political or legal action, for which no
adequate reason can be brought to mind.9
Indignation is sometimes not caused by reasons,10 and people can be
dumbfounded when they are asked to explain why they are indignant. For
some moral problems, people are unaware of the principles that are
motivating their judgments, and they might not endorse those principles on
reflection. 1 In fact, some puzzling outcomes, in both politics and law, are a
product of indignation that is simultaneously intense and hard to justify. 12
Often the legal system tracks moral judgments for which reasons are hard to
give; some political and legal disputes are a direct result. i3 In constitutional
7. See Kohlberg, supra note I.
8. See, e.g., Haidt, The Emotional Dog, supranote 2, at 814.

9. Id. at 817.
10. See Hauser, supranote 3, at 16.
11. See Fiery Cushman et al., The Role of Conscious Reasoning and Intuition in Moral
Judgment: Testing Three Principles of Harm, 17 PSYCHOL. SCL 1082, 1086-87 (2006) (finding that

people appear responsive to a principle that distinguishes between intended harm and foreseen harm, but
that they do not appeal to that principle in their own justifications).
12. See BRYAN CAPLAN, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL VOTER: WHY DEMOCRACIES CHOOSE
BAD POLICIES 1 (2007); Cass R. Sunstein, MoralHeuristics,28 BEHAV. & BRAIN Sc. 531, 536 (2005).
13. See generally Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); LEON KASS, The Wisdom of
Repugnance,in THE ETHICS OF HuMAN CLONING 3 (Leon R. Kass & James Q. Wilson eds., 2001).
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law, rationality review might be understood as a response to the risk of
moral dumbfounding.14
Moral dumbfounding finds its mirror image in moral numbness, in
which people are not indignant even though they have reason to be, and
know they do. Consider, for example, the generally tepid reaction to natural
disasters or even genocide in a distant nation, 15 contrasting with intense
responses to incidents involving a single identifiable victim. 16 It is difficult
to produce widespread indignation in the face of large numbers of foreign
deaths. An important question is whether effective responses might
nonetheless be motivated through vivid accounts, triggering indignation and
hence action after all, or through
legal institutions, producing action even
7
when indignation is absent.'
The remainder of this Article is divided into four parts. Part I
explores the central psychological points. It sketches two families of
operations within the human mind; the first is rapid and automatic whereas
the second is slower and more deliberative. It suggests that the automatic
system plays a role in discrimination on the basis of race and sex, in
judgments about risks, and in assessing fairness. Part H explores the outrage
heuristic and its relationship to punishment judgments and to risk
regulation. A special point here is a kind of rhetorical asymmetry that
applies within deliberating groups, heightening outrage among group
members. Part III turns to moral framing and its effects on jury behavior
and the monetary valuation of human life. Part IV investigates the role of
moral intuitions in distinguishing between acts and omissions, in giving
special attention to "identifiable victims," and in imposing direct and
indirect harm.
I. THE Two-SYSTEM MODEL OF THE MIND
Consider the expression "17 x 24 = ?". For the great majority of
people, the correct answer to the question will come to mind only if it is
produced by a voluntary mental activity, which involves deliberate
application of a rule, requires several steps of computation, storage, and
retrieval, and takes a significant amount of time. For contrast, consider the
14. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (2003); City ofClebume v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S.
432, 448-50 (1985).
15. See Paul Slovic, "Ifl Look At the Mass I Will Never Act": Psychic Numbing and Genocide,
2 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 79, 82-90 (2007), http://joumal.sjdm.org/jdm7303a.pdf (presenting a
psychological model for understanding public apathy to genocide).
16. Karen Jenni & George Loewenstein, Explaining the Identifiable Victim Effect, 14 J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY 235, 236,253 (1997).
17. Slovic, supranote 15, at 91.
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word "vomit." For the great majority of people, disgust will come to mind
in a completely involuntary process, which is produced very quickly by a
process which is itself unconscious-one is aware only of its outcome. The
two examples represent different families of cognitive processes.
A. Intuition and Reflection
The ancient idea that cognitive processes can be partitioned into two
main families-traditionally called "intuition" and "reason"--is now
widely embraced under the general label of dual-process theories. 18 Dualprocess theories come in many forms, but all distinguish cognitive
operations 9 that are quick and associative from others that are slower, more
reflective, and frequently more calculative. 20 The generic labels "System 1"
2
and "System 2" are adopted from Keith Stanovich and Richard West. '
These terms may suggest the image of autonomous homunculi, and there is
growing evidence that the two systems correspond to different locations in
the brain,22 but I do not suggest that the two systems are independent. 23 The
18. See, e.g., Shelly Chaiken & Yaacov Trope, Preface to DUAL-PROCESS THEORIES INSOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY, at ix (Shelly Chaiken & Yaacov Trope eds., 1999); Steven A. Sloman, The Empirical
Case for Two Systems of Reasoning, 119 PSYCHOL. BULL. 3, 3 (1996) (discussing dual reasoning as
composed of one associative system and one "rule based" system). For a discussion and partial criticism,
see Michael L. Spezio & Ralph Adolphs, Emotional Processing and Political Judgment: Toward
Integrating PoliticalPsychology and Decision Neuroscience, in THE AFFECT EFFECT, supra note 4, at
71, 73-76.
19. Thus we do not mean to venture any controversial view about the relationship between

emotions and cognition. For varying views, see JON ELSTER, ALCHEMIES OF THE MIND 239-331 (1999);
MARTHA NUSSBAUM, UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT (2001).

20. See Daniel T. Gilbert, What the Mind's Not, in DUAL-PROCESS THEORIES IN SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 18, at 3; Elizabeth A. Phelps, The Interaction of Emotion and Cognition. The
Relation Between the Human Amygdala and Cognitive Awareness, in THE NEW UNCONSCIOUS 61 (Ran
R. Hassin, James S. Uleman & John A. Bargh eds., 2005).
21. Keith E. Stanovich & Richard F. West, IndividualDifferences in Reasoning: Implications
for the Rationality Debate?, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 421

(Thomas Gilovich etal. eds., 2002) [hereinafter Stanovich & West, IndividualDifferences in Reasoning].
22. JOSEPH LEDOux, THE EMOTIONAL BRAIN 163-65 (2003); William D. Casebeer, Moral

Cognition and Its Neural Constituents, 4 NATURE REVS. NEUROSCIENCE 841, 845 (2003); Joshua D.
Greene etal., The Neural Bases of Cognitive Conflict and Control in Moral Judgment, 44 NEURON 389,
398 (2004); Carla L. Harenski & Stephan Harmann, Neural Correlatesof RegulatingNegative Emotions
Relating to Moral Violations, 30 NEUROIMAGE 313, 317 (2006); Jorge Moll et al., Morals and the
Human Brain: A Working Model, 14 NEUROREPORT 299, 301-02 (2003); Greene, The Secret Joke,
supra note 2, at 40-41. See generally Jana Schaich Borg et al., Consequences, Action, and Intention as
Factorsin Moral Judgments: AnfMRI Investigation, 18 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 803, 805 (2006);
Michael Koenigs et al., Damage to the Prefrontal Cortex Increases UtilitarianMoral Judgements, 446
NATURE 908, 908 (2007).
23. On their mutual dependence, see the different perspectives in D.A. Pizarro & Paul Bloom,
The Intelligence of Moral Intuitions: Comment on Haidt, 110 PSYCHOL. REV. 193, 194 (2003)
(emphasizing the role of reflection in checking intuitions), and Jonathan Haidt, The EmotionalDog Does
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term "systems" is used as a label for collections of processes that are
distinguished by their speed, their controllability, and the contents on which
they operate.24
System 1 (Intuitive)
Automatic
Effortless
Associative
Rapid
Opaque process
Skilled

System 2 (Reflective)
Controlled
Effortful
Deductive
Slow
Self-aware
Rule-following

Table 1
Two Cognitive Systems
Although System 1 is more primitive than System 2, it is not always or
necessarily less capable. On the contrary, complex cognitive operations
eventually migrate from System 2 to System 1 as proficiency and skill are
acquired. 25 A striking demonstration of the intelligence of System 1 is the
ability of professional tennis players to know what shot to hit instantly, and
in that sense intuitively. For those experts, pattern matching has replaced
effortful serial processing. For those who study law as well, there is evident
movement, over time, from the controlled and effortful to the rapid and
intuitive. Sometimes the movements occur within people, permitting
intuition to replace effort; sometimes social changes occur over time, so
that for most people, System 1 develops rapid judgments, moral, legal, or
otherwise, that differ radically from the intuitive judgments of mere
decades before.26 In the areas of both law and morality, consider the
trajectory of the practice of sexual harassment, which often produces
intuitive indignation today, but did so far less often in, say, 1960. It is also
Learn New Tricks: A Reply to PizarroandBloom, 1 10 PSYCHOL. REv. 197, 197 (2003) (suggesting that

deliberate efforts to oppose moral intuitions are rare).
24. There is an evident connection between System I and the affect heuristic, discussed in Paul
Slovic et al., The Affect Heuristic, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 21, at 397. The affect
heuristic, as Slovic and his coauthors describe it, can be seen as System I in action, and it can account
for moral judgments as well as judgments of other kinds. Id.
25.

See generally GARY KLEIN, SOURCES OF POWER: How PEOPLE MAKE DECISIONS (1999).

26. See the discussion of "moralization" in Paul Rozin, The Process of Moralization, 10
PSYCHOL. SC. 218, 219-20 (1999). See also Paul Rozin & L. Singh, The Moralization of Cigarette
Smoking in the United States, 8 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 339 (1999); Paul Rozin et al., Moralizationand
Becoming a Vegetarian: The Transformation of Preferences Into Value and the Recruitment of Disgust,
8 PSYCHOL. SCI. 67, 72 (1997).
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possible that the reflective judgments produced by System 2 will be based
on errors of one or another kind, and that people's intuitive revulsion is
telling whatever System 2 might say; many criticisms of utilitarianism are
rooted in this view.27
In the particular dual-process model explored here, System 1 quickly
proposes intuitive answers to judgment problems as they arise, and
System 2 monitors the quality of these proposals, which it may endorse,
correct, or override.28 The judgments that are eventually expressed are
called "intuitive" if they retain the hypothesized initial proposal without
much modification. There is an obvious relationship between this claim and
the (controversial) use of intuitions in the search for reflective equilibrium
in thinking about justice.29 When people have a strong intuitive belief that
some practice is immoral, that belief may well operate as a fixed point in
the search for reflective equilibrium, even if it should not. In an implicit
celebration of System 1, ethicist Leon Kass points to the fact that human
beings "intuit and feel, immediately' 30and without argument, the violation of
things that we rightfully hold dear.
In both politics and law, analogical reasoning also involves System 1
and System 2, as intuitive judgments about analogy, or disanalogy, become
tested and refined through more reflective invocation of relevant
similarities. 31 An evident possibility is that the legal arguments that are said
to support an outcome, or a court's explanation of a judgment of perceived
analogousness, are not at all causal; in adjudication as in morality, the
motivation for the conclusion may not be well understood even by those

27. See generally Martha Nussbaum, Foreword, Constitutions and Capabilities, 121 HARv. L.
REv. 4 (2007); Bernard Williams, A Critique of Utilitarianism,in UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST
(J.J.C. Smart & Bernard Williams eds., 1973). An especially vivid plea for respectful use of what we
would call System I can be found in Leon Kass, supra note 13, at 19, and particularly in this suggestion:
"We are repelled by the prospect of cloning human beings not because of the strangeness or novelty of
the undertaking, but because we intuit and feel, immediately and without argument, the violation of
things that we rightfully hold dear.... Shallow are the souls that have forgotten how to shudder." Id. If
my argument here is correct, there is a possibility that even when System 1 is shuddering, System 2
should be called into action.
28. This approach is consistent with claims in Pizarro & Bloom, supranote 23, at 195, and the
evidence reviewed in Greene & Haidt, supra note 2, at 522.
29. See JOHN RAwLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 42-45 (rev. ed. 1999). On the controversial
character of the use of intuitions, see Greene, The Secret Joke, supra note 2, at 46-48; APPIAI, supra
note 4, at 75.
30. See Kass, supranote 13, at 19.
31.

See EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 1-8 (1949); Scott

Brewer, Exemplary Reasoning: Semantics, Pragmatics,and the Force of Legal Argument by Analogy,
109 HARv. L. REv. 923, 950-51 (1996). For a valuable discussion, suggesting the power of what might
be called a well-educated System 1,see LLOYD WEINREB, LEGAL REASON: THE USE OF ANALOGY IN
LEGAL ARGUMENT 68-77 (2005).
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who reach that conclusion.32 If System 1 plays a large role in the judgments
not only of juries but of judges
as well, then litigants must find a way to
33
speak directly to its concerns.
The roles of the two systems in determining ultimate judgments depend
on features of the task and of the individual, including the topic, 34 the time
available for deliberation,3 5 the respondent's mood,36 and intelligence.3 7
Without time for deliberation, for example, indignation can be extremely
intense; when people have time to reflect, their reaction sometimes
diminishes.38 And when System 1 is not indignant, and people are morally
numb, deliberation can heighten moral concern and possibly produce
indignation (although this can take a great deal of heavy lifting on the part
of System 2). It appears that System 1 and System 2 can be concurrently
active,39 that automatic and controlled cognitive operations compete for the
control of overt responses,40 and that much of the time, deliberative
judgments will remain anchored on initial impressions.41
B. Accessibility
A defining property of intuitive thoughts is that they come to mind
spontaneously, like percepts. The technical term for the ease with which
mental contents come to mind is accessibility.42 To understand intuition in
32. See Cushman et al., supra note 11, at 1086; Hauser, et al., supra note 3, at 16-17. In this
sense, an understanding of moral intuitions does legal realism one better. Where the realists believed
that legal reasoning often masked the actual grounds for judicial judgments, see Karl N. Llewellyn,
Some Realism About Realism-Respondingto Dean Pound,44 HARv. L. REv. 1222, 1228, 1233 (1931),
the psychological point is that judges may not even be aware of those grounds.
33. Cf DREW WESTEN, THE POLITICAL BRAIN: THE ROLE OF EMOTION IN DECIDING THE
FATE OF THE NATION (2007) (making a claim of this general sort for political campaigns).
34. See Borg et al., supranote 22, at 808.
35. See Melissa L. Finucane et al, The Affect Heuristic in Judgments of Risks and Benefits, 13
J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 1, 8 (2000).
36. See Herbert Bless et al., Mood and the Use of Scripts: Does a Happy Mood Really Lead to
Mindlessness?, 71 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 665, 665 (1996); Alice M. Isen et al., Influence of
Positive Affect on the Subjective Utility of Gains and Losses: It is Just Not Worth the Risk, 55 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 710, 716 (1988).
37. See generally Stanovich & West, IndividualDifferences in Reasoning, supranote 21.
38. See Greene, The Secret Joke, supra note 2, at 45; Haidt, The EmotionalDog, supra note 2,
at 814-15.
39. See Greene & Haidt, supra note 2, at 522; Dan Cassino & Milton Lodge, The Primacy of
Affect in PoliticalEvaluations,in THE AFFECT EFFECT, supra note 4, at 101, 106-07.
40. For evidence, see Greene, The Secret Joke, supra note 2, at 45; Alan G. Sanfey et al., The
Neural Basis of Economic Decision-Makingin the Ultimatum Game, 300 SCIENCE 1755, 1756-57 (2003).
41. See Haidt, The Emotional Dog,supra note 2, at 814.
42. E. Tory Higgins, Knowledge Activation: Accessibility Applicability, and Salience, in
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: HANDBOOK OF BASIC PRINCIPLES 133 (E. Tory Higgins & Arie Kruglanski

eds., 1996).
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general and the operation of indignation in particular, we must understand
why some thoughts are accessible and others are not.
Some attributes are more accessible than others, both in perception and
in judgment. Attributes that are routinely and automatically produced by the
perceptual system or by System 1, without intention or effort, have been
called natural assessments.43 For example, experimental evidence shows
that when a perceiver is exposed to a set of objects of the same general kind
(e.g., a set of lines of different size), attributes of a prototypical member of
the set (e.g., the average length of the lines) are computed effortlessly and
automatically. Other attributes (e.g., the total length of the lines) are not
accessible-they can only be assessed by a deliberate and quite laborious
computation. Thus, average length is a natural assessment, but total length
is not. Daniel Kahneman and Shane Frederick compiled a partial list of
these natural assessments.44 In addition to physical properties such as size,
distance, and loudness, the list includes more abstract properties such as
similarity, causal propensity, surprisingness, affective valence, and mood.
The evaluation of stimuli as good or bad is a particularly important
natural assessment. The evidence, both behavioral 45 and neurophysiological, 46 is consistent with the idea that the assessment of whether
objects are good (and should be approached) or bad (should be avoided) is
carried out quickly and efficiently by specialized neural circuitry.47 A
remarkable experiment reported by John Bargh illustrates the speed of the
evaluative process, and its direct link to approach and avoidance.48
Participants were shown a series of stimuli on a screen, and instructed to
respond to each stimulus as soon as it appeared, by moving a lever that
blanked the screen. The stimuli were affectively charged words, some
positive (e.g., LOVE) and some aversive (e.g., VOMIT), but this feature
was irrelevant to the participant's task. Half the participants responded by
pulling the lever toward themselves, half responded by pushing the lever
away. Although the response was initiated within a fraction of a second,
43. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Extensional Versus Intuitive Reasoning: The
Conjunction Fallacyin ProbabilityJudgment, 90 PSYCHOL. REV. 293, 294 (1983).
44. Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick, Representativeness Revisited: Attribute Substitution
in Intuitive Judgment, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supranote 21, at 49, 55.
45. See John Bargh, The Automaticity of Everyday Life, in THE AUTOMATICITY OF EVERYDAY

LIFE: ADVANCES INSOCIAL COGNITION I (Robert S. Wyer, Jr. ed., 1997); Robert B. Zajonc, Emotions,
in HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 591 (D.T. Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed. 1998).

46. See, e.g., Joseph E. LeDoux, Emotional Circuits in the Brain, 23 ANN.

REV.

NEUROSCIENCE 155, 155 (2000).
47. For a demonstration with respect to risks, see Michael Siegrist et al., Implicit Attitudes
Toward Nuclear Power and Mobile Phone Base Stations: Support for the Affect Heuristic, 26 RISK
ANALYSIS 1021 (2006).
48. Bargh, supra note 45, at 27.
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well before the meaning of the stimulus was consciously registered, the
emotional valence of the word had a substantial effect. Participants were
relatively faster in pulling a lever toward themselves (approach) for positive
words, and relatively faster pushing the lever away (avoid) when the word
was aversive. The tendencies to approach or avoid were evoked by an
automatic process that was not under conscious voluntary control.
Exploring questions related to public policy, several psychologists have
investigated the influence of this primordial evaluative system (here
included in System 1) on the attitudes and preferences that people adopt
consciously and deliberately. 49 The most well-known results come from the
implicit-attitude test, designed to measure racial and other biases. 50 The
central finding is that most people show an automatic bias against AfricanAmericans, older people, gays and lesbians, and others-even when they
are unaware of it, wish to be unbiased, and indeed are stunned to see that
they are automatically biased. 5' There is evidence that people's actual
behavior is sometimes affected by their automatic biases rather than by their
conscious judgments.52 This evidence bears on many questions in the law of
discrimination because it suggests that those who discriminate might not
even be aware of that fact, increasing the difficulty of proving unequal
treatment even when it has occurred. 3
The implicit-attitude test has also been used to show that people tend to
be intuitively opposed to nuclear power, even when they are not opposed to
it consciously or on reflection, and indeed even when they do not believe
that they are opposed to it in any way.5 4 An evident implication, consistent
with recent political reality, is that public officials will have difficulty in
convincing the public to support nuclear power because people's affective
49. See, e.g., Zajonc, supra note 45, at 601-06; Daniel Kahneman et al., Economic Preferences
or Attitude Expressions?An Analysis of DollarResponses to Public Issues, 19 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY
203, 206-10 (1999); Paul Slovic et al., The Affect Heuristic,supra note 24, at 397; Seymour Epstein,
Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory of Personality,in 5 HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY: PERSONALITY
AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 159-84 (T. Millon & M.J. Lerner eds., 2003).
50. A variety of such tests are available through Project Implicit, https:Himplicit.harvard.edu/
implicit/ (follow "Demonstration" hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 8, 2009). See generally Symposium on
BehavioralRealism, 94 CAL. L. REV. 945 (2006).
51. See Brian A. Nosek et al., Harvesting Implicit Group Attitudes and Beliefs from a
Demonstration Website, 6 GROuP DYNAMICS: THEORY RES. & PRAC. 101, 101-07 (2002). On legal
implications, see generally Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law ofImplicit Bias, 94 CAL. L.
REV. 969 (2006).
52. See Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific
Foundations, 94 CAL. L. REV. 945, 946 (2006). The relationship between implicit bias and actual
behavior is disputed. See Gregory Mitchell & Philip E. Tetlock, AntidiscriminationLaw and the Perils
of Mindreading,67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1023, 1029-30 (2006).
53. See Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARv. L. REV. 1489, 1513-14 (2005).
54. See Michael Siegrist et al., supranote 47, at 1025.
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systems are opposed to it. 55 A more general lesson is that affective
assessments of products, processes, and risks will often drive5 6people's
conclusions, and that statistical realities will play a secondary role.
For a striking illustration of the interaction among indignation,
System 1, and moral judgments, consider the Ultimatum Game,57 which has
become a staple of analysis of fairness judgments in domains relevant to
politics and law. 58 In this game, subjects are randomly assigned to the roles
of "proposers" or "responders." Proposers suggest a division of a stated
amount of money (say, $10) with responders; responders can answer "Yes"
or "no." If responders answer yes, both sides receive money in accordance
with the proposed division. If responders answer no, neither side receives
any money. The standard economic prediction is that proposers will suggest
that they receive nearly all of the money and that responders will agree;
self-interested behavior on both sides would suggest that outcome. 59 This is
not what happens. Responders often reject, with indignation, offers that are
worse than 60:40, and 50:50 divisions are common.6 °
For purposes of analyzing the role of System 1 in judgments related to
fairness, consider a few recent findings. When responders are provided with
unequal offers, identifiable sectors of the brain associated with emotions are
unusually active-and when responders do accept unequal offers, there is
unusual activity in the sectors of the brain associated with cognitive
control.6' Studies of skin conductance activity, measuring affect, find that
such activity is higher for unfair offers and associated with rejection of such
offers.62 Feelings of anger are therefore a more accurate predictor of
whether people will reject unfair offers than is the unfairness of the offer
itself.63 Notably, skin conductance activity is not shown for offers that are
generated by computers. 64 Indignation drives responders' behavior in the
55. Id. at 1026.
56. See Peter M. Sandman et al., Communications to Reduce Risk Underestimation and
Overestimation, 3 RISK DECISION & POL'Y 93 (1998) [hereinafter Sandman et al., Communications to
Reduce Risk]; Peter M. Sandman et al., Agency Communication, Community Outrage, andPerceptionof
Risk: Three Simulation Experiments, 13 RISK ANALYSIS 35 (1994); Slovic, supra note 15, at 84, 89, 91.
57. For a good overview, see Richard H. Thaler, The Ultimatum Game, in THE WINNER'S
CURSE 21 (1992).
58. See, e.g., WARD FARNSWORTH, THE LEGAL ANALYST: A TOOLKIT FOR THINKING ABOUT

THE LAW 209-46 (2007); Christine Jolls et al., A BehavioralApproach to Law andEconomics, 50 STAN.
L. REv. 1471, 1498 (1998).
59. Thaler, supra note 57, at 23.
60. Id. at 35.
61. See Sanfey et al., supra note 40, at 1757.
62. See Mascha van 't Wout et al., Affective State and Decision-Making in the Ultimatum
Game, 169 EXPERIMENTAL BRAIN RES. 564, 566 (2006).
63. Id.
at 567.
64. Id. at 566.

HeinOnline -- 33 Vt. L. Rev. 415 2008-2009

416

Vermont Law Review

[Vol. 33:405

Ultimatum Game, and it ensures that people will sacrifice their material
self-interest in order to punish unfairness. It is reasonable to speculate that
when people punish defectors from a collective endeavor, 65 at the expense
of their own self-interest, similar processes are also at work. Voluntary
solutions of collective-action problems, making law unnecessary, are made
possible in part by the fact that would-be defectors anticipate punishment.
C. Attribute Substitution
To complete this sketch of the operations of System 1, we explore a
process of attribute substitution that shapes many judgments and choices.
The concept was introduced by Kahneman and Frederick as a basic
mechanism to explain the results of heuristic judgment.66 The basic idea is
that the reduction of complex tasks to simpler operations, which
characterizes such judgments, is achieved by an operation in which an
individual assesses "a specified target attribute of a judgment object by
substituting another property of that object-the heuristic attribute-which
comes more readily to mind." 67 In the legal domain, as I show later,
individuals charged with the task of determining the severity of a
punishment appear to solve this difficult problem by consulting the
intensity of their outrage.
Several of the processes explored thus far are involved in the
explanation of a study in the area of tort law reported by Miller and
McFarland in which respondents determined the appropriate compensation
for a man who was shot in the arm during the robbery of a grocery store.68
Some respondents were told that the robbery happened at the victim's
regular store. Other respondents were told that the victim was shot in a store
that he visited for the first time because his usual store happened to be
closed that day. The two versions obviously differ in poignancy, because
the counterfactual "undoing" of an unusual event comes more easily to
mind than the undoing of a normal occurrence.
The difference of poignancy translated into a remarkable difference of
$100,000 in the median award judged appropriate for the two cases. 6 9 The
participants in this experiment apparently answered the difficult question of
appropriate question by mapping onto a scale of dollars their answer to a
simple question: How much were they emotionally touched by the story?
65. Ernst Fehr & Simon GCchter, Altruistic Punishmentin Humans, 415 NATURE 137, 139 (2002).
66. Kahneman & Frederick, supra note 44, at 53.
67. Id.
68. D.T. Miller & C. McFarland, CounterfactualThinking and Victim Compensation: A Test of
Norm Theory, 12 PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 513, 514-16 (1986).
69. Id.
at 515.
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It is most unlikely that the respondents deliberately chose to provide
this large compensation for poignancy. Indeed, when respondents were
presented with both versions of the robbery story and asked whether a
compensation board should make different awards in the two cases, ninety
percent thought it should not.70 In the terms of the present discussion, the
emotion-anchored process that produced the initial awards is dominated by
System 1. The requirement to compare two questions evokes a much more
complex activity, here attributed to System 2, which identifies the
distinctive element that separates the two versions and is unable to find any
awards. This can be seen as an instance of
moral justification for different
"moral dumbfounding, '' 71 in which a strong intuition exists that cannot be
anchored in rules that the person consciously accepts.
II. OUTRAGE, PUNISHMENT, AND HARM

Along with several coauthors, I have studied the operation of moral
judgments in the particular domain of punitive-damage awards.72 One of
our hypotheses, couched in the language of the present treatment, was that
the setting of such awards is mediated by an outrage heuristic.73 Dollar
74
awards are highly variable, and the variability presents its own puzzles;
the concern here is the operation of the outrage heuristic and its relationship
to System 1. The most general finding is that even if they state a commitment
to deterrence, people are intuitive retributivists, and their judgments about
appropriate monetary punishment have their origin in outrage.7 5
A. The Role of Harm
Participants drawn from a jury roll in Texas were shown vignettes of
cases in which a plaintiff had suffered a personal injury while using a
product. For example, one of the scenarios concerned a child who had been
burned when his pajamas caught fire as he was playing with matches. The
70. Id.
71. Haidt, The New Synthesis, supra note 2, at 317.
72. See generally Daniel Kahneman, David Schkade & Cass R. Sunstein, Shared Outrage and
Erratic Awards: The Psychology of Punitive Damages, 16 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 49 (1998)
[hereinafter Kahneman etal., Shared Outrage]; Cass R. Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman & David Schkade,
Assessing Punitive Damages, 107 YALE L.J. 2071 (1998).
73. We understand the term "indignation" as interchangeable with the term "outrage." The
outrage heuristic might be seen as a special case of the affect heuristic, discussed in Slovic, supra note
15, at 82-86.
74. See Kahneman et al., Shared Outrage,supra note 72, at 53.
75. Cass R. Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman, David Schkade & Ilana Ritov, PredictablyIncoherent
Judgments, 54 STAN. L. REv. 1153, 1167 (2002) [hereinafter Sunstein et al., PredictablyIncoherent].
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pajamas were made of fabric that was not adequately fire-resistant, and the
defendant firm had been aware of the problem. For some of the scenarios,
alternative versions were constructed that differed in the severity of harm.
In the high-harm version of the pajamas case, for example, the child was
"severely burned over a significant portion of his body and required several
weeks in hospital and months of physical therapy." In the low-harm
version, "his hands and arms were badly burned and required professional
medical treatment for several weeks." Participants were told that the
plaintiff had already been awarded compensatory damages. One group of
respondents indicated whether punitive damages were appropriate, and if so
in what amount. Another group rated the outrageousnessof the defendant's
behavior. In a subsequent re-analysis of this study, Kahneman and
Frederick also obtained ratings of the severity of the harm suffered in each
of the fourteen vignettes.7 6 Lawsuits were not mentioned in these
descriptions of harm. The same basic design was replicated twice, varying
the size of the defendant firm.
The results supported the conclusion that assessments of punitive
damages (the target attribute in this study) were mediated by an outrage
heuristic.17 In the analysis offered by Kahneman and Frederick, the outrage
associated with each case was estimated by the product of the product of the
average ratings of outrageousness and of harm.7 8 The correlations (over
fourteen vignettes) between the estimate of outrage and mean punitive
damages were 0.90 in one of the firm-size conditions and 0.94 in the other.
The role of actual harm as a determinant of outrage in this experiment
is also of interest as a potential case of moral dumbfounding. 79 The legally
recognized distinction between murder and attempted murder is a salient
example of the issue. Consider the following scenarios:
1. A wishes B dead but does nothing about it
2. A tries to kill B and fails by chance
3. A tries to kill B and succeeds

76. Kahneman & Frederick, supra note 44, at 63.
77. To the same general effect, see Kevin M. Carlsmith et al., Why Do We Punish? Deterrence
andJust Deserts as Motives for Punishment, 83 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 284, 292-93 (2002).
78. Kahneman & Frederick, supra note 44, at 64.
79. The effect of the outrage heuristic can also be seen in the finding that contrary to the
standard economic account, people do not want to increase punitive awards when the likelihood of
detection is low or to decrease such awards when the likelihood of detection is high. They respond to the
outrageousness of the underlying conduct; the likelihood of detection is relevant, if at all, only because it
bears on that question. See Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade & Daniel Kahnernan, Do People Want
Optimal Deterrence?, 29 J. LEGAL STuD. 237, 246 (2000); Carlsmith et al., supra note 77, at 285-89.

HeinOnline -- 33 Vt. L. Rev. 418 2008-2009

Some Effects of Moral Indignationon Law

2009]

It is not so easy to offer a moral distinction between the last two cases.
Indeed, it is safe to assume that if people are asked to judge the
outrageousness of the actions, there will be no difference. But punitive
intent reflects the emotional intensity of the response to the event, and the
emotion evidently depends on the harm that actually occurred. In the terms
of the present analysis, the severity of punishment reflects the intensity of
an emotional reaction in System 1. Punishments that are determined in this
manner are expected to be crudely retributive, which is what we observe. 0
Note that the argument here is not that it is impossible to defend the
distinction, drawn by the criminal law, between murder and attempted
murder. There may be good reasons for drawing that distinction. 8 1 What I
am suggesting is that the distinction is not caused by those reasons,
supposing they exist; 82 it is caused by the fact that moral intuitions,
automatic and uncontrolled, are different in the two cases.
B. Outrageand Risk
The outrage heuristic helps to explain a wide range of moral judgments
of relevance to policy and law, especially in the domain of risk regulation.
Consider, for example, the evident fact that many jurors are outraged by the
practice of cost-benefit analysis, in the sense that juries strenuously object
to a corporate decision to trade off lives and dollars-even when lives have
been highly valued. 83 Legitimate questions can be raised about cost-benefit
analysis, 84 but public outrage, to the extent that it exists, is rooted in a
strong intuition that people should not act with the knowledge that their
action will cause people to die. Cost-benefit analysis is a matter for
System 2; System 1 reacts by asking whether the defendant proceeded with
knowledge that its actions would lead to human deaths.8 5
Or consider widespread public skepticism about emissions-trading
programs, by which polluters are given pollution rights and permitted to
trade those rights for a fee.86 Many people are outraged by such programs,
80. See Kahneman et al., Shared Outrage,supra note 72, at 52.
81. See generally Michael Davis, "hy Attempts Deserve Less Punishment Than Complete
Crimes, 5 LAW & PHIL. I (1986).
82. For a similar conclusion in the context of choices among political candidates, see Cassino
& Lodge, supranote 39, at 101, 119.
83. See W. Kip Viscusi, Corporate Risk Analysis: A Reckless Act, 52 STAN. L. REv. 547,
550 (2000).
84. See FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS 8-12 (2005).
85. See Greene, The Secret Joke, supra note 2, at 45. This claim is consistent with the findings

in Viscusi, supra note 83, at 571.
86. For a valuable discussion, see generally A. DENNY ELLERMAN, MARKETS FOR CLEAN

AIR (2000).
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and sometimes their outrage has been developed into elaborate critiques
of trading programs. I speculate that their outrage is founded in a simple
heuristic, to the effect that people should not be paid for agreeing not to
commit wrongs. That heuristic generally works well, but it misfires as
applied to the context of emissions-trading programs, which often appear
to be the most effective and efficient means of handling many
environmental problems.88
Several studies have attempted to explore whether outrage operates as
an amplifier with respect to people's perceptions of risks. 89 These
studies hypothesized that certain low-probability risks, such as those
associated with nuclear waste radiation, produce outrage, whereas other
low-probability risks, such as those associated with radon exposure, do
not. (Recall that people tend to show an automatic aversion to nuclear
power.9 ) A central finding is consistent with the account offered here: a
large difference in probability had no effect in the "high outrage"
condition, with people responding the same way to a risk of 1/100,000 as
to a risk of 1/1,000,000.91
More striking still: even when the risk was identical in the nuclear
waste (high outrage) and radon (low outrage) cases, people in the nuclear
waste case reported a much greater perceived threat and a much higher
intention to act to reduce that threat.92 Indeed, "the effect of outrage was
practically as large as the effect of the 4000-fold difference in risk between
the high-risk and low-risk conditions. 93 Efforts to communicate the
meaning of differences in risk levels, by showing comparisons to normal
risk levels, reduced the effect of outrage, but even after those efforts,
outrage had nearly the same effect as a 2000-fold increase in risk.94 More
generally, choices among political candidates have been found to turn on
affect and on System 1, even when people are quite unaware of that fact. 95

87. See generally STEVEN KELMAN, WHAT PRICE INCENTIVES? (1981).
88. See RICHARD B. STEWART & JONATHAN WIENER, RECONSTRUCTING CLIMATE CHANGE

POLICY: BEYOND KYOTO 66 (2003). On paying people not to commit wrongs, see Guido Calabresi & A.
Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral,85
HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1115-24 (1972).
89. See, e.g., Sandman et al., Communications to Reduce Risk, supra note 56, at 106.
90. Siegrist etal., supranote 47, at 1025.
91. Sandman etal., Communications to Reduce Risk, supra note 56, at 102.
92. Id. at 106.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See Cassino & Lodge, supra note 39, at 119.
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C. The Severity Shift andRhetoricalAsymmetry
What happens when indignant people deliberate with one another? It
might be tempting to suppose that they would converge on the judgment of
the group's median member. In fact, however, deliberating groups end up
more indignant than their median member, and the consequence can be
especially severe punishment.96
Over 500 deliberating juries, consisting of six people, were asked to
record their judgments in advance of deliberation on three different
questions: the outrageousness of the defendant's conduct on an eight-point
scale; the appropriate punishment, also on an eight-point scale; and the
appropriate dollar award. 97 As we would predict, the correlation between
outrage judgments and punishment judgments was quite close. 98 In both
cases, juries whose members began with a high degree of outrage (four or
higher) produced "verdicts" that were systematically higher than those of the
jury's median member-in a general "severity shift." 99 By contrast, lowlenient, as juries, than
outrage jurors (three or lower) ended up being more
100
shift."
"leniency
general
a
member-in
their median
With dollars, the result was even more dramatic: for the overwhelming
majority of positive awards, the jury's verdict was higher than that of the
median juror.'' And in twenty-seven percent of the cases, the jury's verdict
was at least as high as that of the highest juror.10 2 For punitive-damage awards,
deliberation produces a systematic shift in the direction of greater severity.
These findings might be explained in two different ways. Because of
the robust phenomenon of group polarization, 0 3 it would be predicted that
outraged juries would be more outraged than outraged jurors. A key reason
involves the exchange of information. Such exchange, within a group of
people antecedently inclined to show outrage, tends to produce an
intensification of their antecedent inclination.'0 4 But peer pressure is also
important: jurors are not likely to want to seem to be unconcerned with
serious wrongdoing, even within a group of strangers, and for that reason
deliberation among outraged jurors is likely to fuel outrage.10 5
96.
REv. 1139,
97.
98.
99.
100.

See David Schkade et al., DeliberatingAbout Dollars: The Severity Shift, 100 COLUM. L.
1164 (2000).
Id. at 1149.
Id. at 1152.
Id. at 1153.
Id. at 1155-56.

101.

Id.

102.
103.
104.
105.

Id.
See ROGER BROWN, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 200 to 243 (2d ed. 1986).
Seeid.at217-22.
Seeid. at 213-17.
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With respect to both moral judgments and dollar awards, indignation
can also be intensified as a result of rhetorical asymmetry.10 6 In some
domains, one or another position has an automatic upper hand, in the sense
that people find it easier to support that position in the face of social
conflict. Evidence supports the view that when a group of people disagree
about the appropriate monetary punishment for corporate wrongdoing, it is
simply easier to argue in favor of the higher award. 0 7 Existing social norms
are responsible for the existence of rhetorical asymmetry. It is reasonable to
speculate that the asymmetry is likely to be present, and to be especially
severe, when the issue is simple rather than complex, in the particular sense
that people do not perceive tradeoffs to be present. If, for example, a large
damage award were thought to have adverse effects on innocent employees
or consumers, the asymmetry might well be diminished or eradicated.'0 8
And if one side is able to appeal to "core values" of one or another kind,
such as the protection of human life, then a rhetorical asymmetry is more
likely to be in play. But much work remains to be done on this subject.
An understanding of the effects of social interactions on the operation
of the outrage heuristic and System 1 has many implications. It is
reasonable to think that a rhetorical asymmetry helps explain why it is
easier, in familiar times and places, to argue for stiffer punishments for drug
offenders and murderers-and for decreases rather than increases in tax
rates. When freedom of association leads certain groups to be especially
outraged about past or present treatment, group polarization and rhetorical
asymmetry provide at least part of the picture.' 0 9 "Moral panics," involving
epidemics of outrage directed against certain practices and groups, are
much influenced by the mechanisms sketched here. 1° In addition, social
interactions, including rhetorical asymmetry, help to explain the wellsprings
of terrorism, which is typically a product not of poverty, poor education, or
112
mental illness,' but of social networks that attempt to fuel outrage.

106. See Schkade et al., supranote 96, at 1161.
107. Id. at 1162.
108. Cf. Jonathan Baron & Susan Leshner, How Serious are Expressions of Protected Values?,
6 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 183 (2000) (finding that commitments to protected values, as

immune from tradeoffs, become weaker when tradeoffs are made explicit).
109. Cf Timur Kuran, Ethnic Norms and Their Transformation Through Reputational
Cascades, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 623 (1998) (exploring use of social pressures in producing ethnic
antagonism).
110. See STANLEY COHEN, FOLK DEVILS AND MORAL PANICS 197-98 (2d ed. 1987). See
generallyKENNETH THOMPSON, MORAL PANICS (1998).
111. See ALLAN KRUEGER, WHAT MAKES A TERORIST? 6 (2007) (emphasizing that poor

education and poverty do not appear to contribute to terrorism).
112. See generally MARC SAGEMAN, UNDERSTANDING TERROR NETwORKS (2004).
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III. MORAL FRAMING AND INDIGNATION

A framing effect is said to occur when two extensionally equivalent
statements evoke different judgments or preferences when presented singly,
yet appear transparently equivalent when shown together." 3 Framing
effects arise because statements that are extensionally equivalent may
nevertheless evoke different associations and different emotional responses.
Consider the question whether to undergo a risky medical procedure. When
people are told, "Of those who have this procedure, ninety percent are alive
after five years," they are far more likely to agree to the procedure than
when they are told, "Of those who have this procedure, ten percent are
dead after five years."'"1 4 Experience might be expected to solve this
problem, but doctors too are vulnerable to this framing effect. l 5 Similarly,
a cold cut described as ninety percent fat-free is more attractive than if it
is described as ten percent fat, and more likely to be purchased. Framing
effects are a manifestation of the associative and emotional processes of
System 1. There have been several
demonstrations of framing effects in the
6
domain of moral judgments."
A. Losses and Gains
Consider the valuation of injuries to health, and an experiment in
which the same difference between two states of health was caused to be
coded either as a loss or as a gain. 17 The experiment was concerned with
lay assessments of appropriate monetary compensation for the pain and
suffering associated with personal injuries, such as "losing mobility in one
knee for four years."" 8 Separate samples of respondents were given
different jury instructions describing the thought experiment they should
conduct to determine fair compensation. One of the instructions suggested a
positive choice between two desirable options. The respondents were
instructed to imagine that the victim had very recently suffered the injury
and was now offered a choice between a complete and immediate cure and
an amount of money. Fair compensation was to be set at the highest amount
113. See generally Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the
Psychology of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453 (1981).
114. See Donald A. Redelmeier, Paul Rozin & Daniel Kahneman, Understanding Patients'
Decisions, 270 JAMA 72, 73 (1993).
115. Id.
116. See, e.g., Shane Frederick, Measuring Intergenerational Time Preference: Are Future
Lives Valued Less?, 26 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 39, 41-47 (2003).
117. Edward J. McCaffery, Daniel J. Kahneman & Matthew L. Spitzer, Framing the Jury:
Cognitive Perspectiveson Painand Suffering Awards, 81 VA. L. REV. 1341, 1354-57 (1995).
118. Id. at 1408.
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for which the victim would still prefer the cure. In contrast, the selling
instruction required the respondent to assume that the victim considered an
ex ante proposition to accept the injury in return for a payment of money.
Fair compensation was to be set at the lowest payment for which the victim
would have accepted the offer.
The difference between health and injury is coded as a gain in the
former case and as a loss in the latter-this is the pattern of an endowment
effect." 9 In terms of final states, of course, the two versions of the problem
are not distinguishable. As expected, the average judgment of fair
compensation was about twice as high with the selling than with the choice
instruction. 120 This is also a framing effect: when the participants in each
experimental condition were shown the instruction given to the other group,
they thought both instructions were 121
fair and did not notice that they were
responses.
discrepant
evoke
to
likely
The legal system typically uses a version of the buying instruction
rather than the selling instruction. Jurors are asked what amount would
place plaintiffs in the position that they would have occupied if the injury
had never occurred, and it is impermissible for plaintiffs lawyers to ask
jurors to focus on the amount that the plaintiff would have had to be paid to
accept the injury in the first instance. 122 But courts do not undertake a great
deal of reflective thinking about why the buying instruction should be
preferred, and in general, there is much dispute about whether goods should
be valued by reference to willingness to accept or willingness to pay. 123 In
any event, creative lawyers are sometimes able to frame the problem so as
to ensure that a selling instruction comes24before the jury, in a way that
produces predictably higher dollar awards. 1
B. Valuing Life
Moral framing has been demonstrated in the important context of
obligations to future generations,125 a much-disputed question of morality,
politics, and law 126 with particular importance for the issue of climate
119. See RICHARD H. THALER, QUASI RATIONAL ECONOMICS 8 (1991); Russell Korobkin, The

Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. REv. 1227, 1228 (2003).
120. McCaffery et al., supra note 117, at 1359.
121. Id. at 1371.
122. W. Kip Viscusi, Pain and Suffering in Product Liability Cases: Systematic Compensation
or CapriciousAwards?, 8 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 203, 203 (1988).
123. See generally Korobkin, supra note 119.
124. McCaffery et al., supra note 117, at 1399.
125. See Frederick, supra note 116, at 46-47.
126. See generally Symposium, IntergenerationalEquity andDiscounting, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1
(2007); Richard Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the Discounting of
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change. 127 Most people have not given a great deal of thought to the
appropriate discount rate for those yet to be born, and hence their judgments
are highly susceptible to different frames. With some frames, lower
weighting of future generations will seem natural and unexceptionable.
With other frames, people will find it outrageous to suggest that future
people should be given less attention than current people. The reason is that
some frames will trigger System 1, producing indignation by suggesting
that some people are "worth less" than others.
From a series of surveys, Maureen Cropper and her coauthors suggest
that people are indifferent between saving one life today and saving 44 lives
in 100 years. 128 They make this suggestion on the basis of questionsasking people whether they would choose a program that saves "100 lives
now" or a program that saves a substantially larger number "100 years from
now." It is possible, however, that people's responses depend on
uncertainty about whether people in the future will otherwise die (perhaps
technological improvements will save them?); other ways of framing the
same problem yield radically different results. 129 For example, most people
consider "equally bad" a single death from pollution next year and a single
death from pollution in 100 years. 130 This finding implies no preference for
members of the current generation. The simplest conclusion is that people's
moral intuitions about obligations
to future generations are very much a
131
product of framing effects.
The same point holds for the question whether government should
consider not only the number of "lives" but also the number of "life-years"
saved by regulatory interventions. 32 If the government focuses on lifeyears, a program that saves children will be worth far more money that a
similar program that saves senior citizens. Is this immoral? People's
intuitions, and their tendency toward indignation, depend on how the
question is framed. 33 If people are asked whether they would favor a policy
that saves 105 old people or 100 young people, many will favor the latter,
in a way that suggests a willingness to pay considerable attention to the
Human Lives, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 941 (1999).
127. See NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 35 (2007).

128. Maureen Cropper et al., Preferencesfor Life-Saving Programs:How the PublicDiscounts
Time andAge, 8 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 243, 244 (1994).
129. See Frederick, supra note 116, at 41-47.
130. Id. at 42.
13 1. For a similar result, see Jonathan Baron, Can We Use Human Judgments to Determine the
Discount Rate?, 20 RISK ANALYSIS 861, 866 (1993).
132. For a brief overview of the controversy, see Jocelyn Kaiser, How Much Are Human Lives
and Health Worth?, 200 SCIENCE 1836, 1836-37 (2003).
133. See Cass R. Sunstein, Lives, Life-Years, and Willingness to Pay, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 205,
244 (2004).
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number of life-years at stake. At the same time, people will predictably
reject as outrageous an approach that would count every old person as
"worth less" than what every young person is worth.
If people are asked whether safety and health policies should adopt a
"senior death discount," or assign a monetary value, for those over sixty
years of age, that is worth some fraction of the monetary value assigned for
all others, there will be a high degree of indignation. System 1 rebels
against the idea that older people are worth (say) sixty percent of what
younger people are worth (even if System 2 might ultimately be persuaded
that the life-years approach is the right one). Facing such indignation, the
national government eventually retreated from a suggestion that federal
agencies should adopt a "senior death discount" to take account of the fact
that some policies mostly134helped people who were already old and thus had
relatively few years left.
C. Coherence andIncoherence
Framing effects present a large difficulty for the achievement of
coherent judgments and preferences. The normal process of comprehension
takes a given message to a state of the world, but the correspondence of
messages and states is not one-to-one. Ambiguity arises when a single
message is compatible with multiple states of the world. Framing effects
arise when a single state of the world may be described in multiple ways,
and when a relevant response is description-dependent. Thus, the avoidance
of framing effects requires a search through the set of descriptions that are
extensionally equivalent to the original message. Unfortunately, the human
mind is not equipped to solve this problem.
In the context of both punitive-damage awards and valuation of
environmental amenities, my coauthors and I have found that incoherence in
both moral and legal judgments is predictable. 13 The problem is especially
severe for judgments rooted in indignation, the intensity of which depends
on the relevant comparison set. To take a mundane example, rude behavior
by a guest at a dinner table can produce extremely intense indignation on the
part of a host, even if such behavior is trivial compared to (say) theft, assault,
and child abuse. System 1 is deeply offended by rude behavior at dinner in
part because such behavior is automatically compared to standard conduct at
dinner-not to a wide range of inappropriate or bad behavior in which human
beings engage. If a host at dinner takes the guest's rude behavior in the
134. Cindy Skryzycki, Under Fire, EPA Drops the "Senior Death Discount," WASH. POST,
May 13, 2003, at El.
135. Sunstein et al., PredictablyIncoherent, supranote 75, at 1165.
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context of much worse conduct, indignation is likely to be greatly dampened.
It turns out that punishment judgments have a similar structure.
The basic point is that such judgments about cases, taken one at a time,
are very different from judgments about the same cases, taken in the context
of a problem from another category. In the relevant experiments, people
were asked to assess a case involving a personal injury on a bounded scale
and also on a dollar scale. 136 People were also asked to assess a case
involving financial injury on a bounded scale and also on a dollar scale.
When the two cases were judged in isolation, the financial injury case
received a more severe rating and a higher dollar award. But when the two
cases were seen together, there was a significant judgment shift, in which
people tried to ensure that the financial award was not higher than the
personal injury award. 137 People's decisions about the two cases were very
different, depending on whether
they saw a case alone or in the context of a
138
case from another category.
An explanation for the shift starts with the suggestion that when people
see a case in isolation, they naturally "normalize" it by comparing it to a set
of comparison cases that it readily calls up. People easily normalize
judgments about size, and the normalization is mutually understood. (Steve
Nash, who is a little more than six feet tall, is a very small basketball
player.) What happens, in ordinary communication, is innocuous. It does
not breed error or confusion. In the context of legally relevant moral
judgments, something similar happens, but it is far from innocuous. When
evaluating a case involving financial injury, people apparently normalize
the defendant's conduct by comparing it with conduct in other cases from
the same category. This is a species of "narrow framing," which is a basic
property of the human mind. 139 People examine problems in the context of
narrow frames, including small sets of similar problems.
It follows that jurors (and in all probability judges too 4°) do not easily
or naturally compare that defendant's conduct with conduct from other
136. Id. at 1174.
137. Id.at1175-77.
138. Exactly the same kind of shift was observed for judgments about two problems calling for
government regulation and expenditures: skin cancer among the elderly and protection of coral reefs.
Looking at the two cases in isolation, people wanted to pay more to protect coral reefs and registered
more satisfaction from doing that. But looking at the two cases together, people were quite disturbed at
this pattern and generally wanted to pay more to protect elderly people from skin cancer. Here too there
was a significant shift in judgment. Id. at 1174.
139. See, e.g., Nicholas Barberis & Ming Huang, The Loss Aversion/Narrow FramingApproach
to the Equity PremiumPuzzle, in THE HANDBOOK OF THE EQUITY RISK PREMIUM 199 (Rajnish Mehra
ed., 2008), availableat http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cftn?abstractid=912776.
140. See the argument for comparison of cases in Martell v. Boardwalk Enters., Inc., 748 F.2d
740, 752-53, 755 (2d Cir. 1984).
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categories. Because of the natural comparison set, people are likely to be
quite outraged by the misconduct if it is far worse than what springs
naturally to mind. When a case from another category is introduced, this
natural process of comparison is disrupted. Rather than comparing a
financial injury case to other cases of business misconduct, people now
compare it to a personal injury case, which (in most people's view) involves
more serious wrongdoing. As a result of the wider viewscreen, judgments
shift, often dramatically.
This finding helps to explain a serious problem with current practice in
many domains of law.' 4 ' The problem is that when people assess cases in
isolation, their viewscreen is narrow, indeed limited to the category to
which the case belongs, and that as a result, people produce a pattern of
outcomes that makes no sense by their own light. In other words, the overall
set of outcomes is one that people would not endorse, if they were only to
see it as a whole. Their considered judgments reflect the very pattern that
they have produced, because of a predictable feature of human cognition.
The result is a form of incoherence.
We can find such incoherence not only in jury verdicts, but also in
administrative fines, where no serious effort has been made to ensure that
the overall pattern of outcomes makes the slightest sense. 142 Indeed there is
reason to believe that the pattern, in many domains, is quite senseless. And
it may not be too much of a stretch to suggest that the same is true of
reactions, some of the time, by both individuals and institutions-that
people are quite outraged about behavior that, in a broader or different
comparison set, would outrage them little or not at all.
These observations have obvious relevance both for the attempt to
reach coherence in law and for the idea of reflective equilibrium in ethical
judgments. 143 For law, the basic lesson is that judgments made one at a time
are likely to produce incoherent patterns, and hence it would be useful to
attempt to systematize outcomes by seeing them as part of larger
comparison sets.' 44 In the world of punitive-damages awards, comparisons
should produce real improvements over isolated judgments, in the sense
that the isolated judgments yield patterns rejected by the very people who
are responsible for them. In the world of administrative penalties,
established pursuant to congressional guidelines, it would make a great deal
141. See generally Cary Coglianese, Bounded Evaluation: Cognition, Incoherence, and
Regulatory Policy, 54 STAN. L. REv. 1217 (2002).
142. See Sunstein et al., Predictably Incoherent, supra note 75, at 1186-96.
143. See RAWLS, supranote 29, at 42-45. For relevant discussion, see APPIAH, supra note 4.
144. See Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling "Painand
Suffering, " 83 Nw. U. L. REv. 908, 924-25 (1989).

HeinOnline -- 33 Vt. L. Rev. 428 2008-2009

2009]

Some Effects of Moral Indignation on Law

of sense to try to produce broader coherence, for example by seeing if fines
for Occupational Safety and Health Act violations fit with fines for Clean
Air Act violations and for violations of the tax law.
For ethical judgments, the search for reflective equilibrium might seem
all the more important in this light, because a wide viewscreen can help to
control indefensibly intense reactions to particular cases. On the other hand,
produce
the attempt to achieve equilibrium between Systems 1 and 2 can
45
real difficulties, the resolution of which we cannot attempt here. 1
IV. ACTS, OMISSIONS, AND RELATED PROBLEMS

To say the least, there has been much discussion of whether and why
the distinction between acts and omissions might matter for morality, law,
and policy.146 In one case, for example, a patient might ask a doctor not to
provide life-sustaining equipment, thus ensuring the patient's death. In
another case, a patient might ask a doctor to inject a substance that will
immediately end the patient's life. Many people seem to have a strong
moral intuition that the failure to provide life-sustaining equipment, and
even the withdrawal of such equipment, is acceptable and legitimate-but
that the injection is morally abhorrent. And indeed American constitutional
law reflects judgments to exactly this effect: people have a constitutional
right to withdraw equipment that is necessary to keep them alive, but they
have no constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide. 147 But what is the
morally relevant difference?
It is worth considering the possibility that the act-omission
distinction is rooted in System 1, and is in some cases very hard to defend
in principle. 148 The moral puzzles arise when life, or a clever interlocutor,
comes up with a case in which there is no morally relevant distinction
between acts and omissions, but when moral intuitions strongly suggest
that there must be such a difference. As an example, consider the question
whether to vaccinate one's children; many people show a persistent
149
omission bias, favoring inaction over statistically preferable action.
The widespread acceptance of withdrawal of life-saving equipment,
145. Paul Slovic and Kwame Anthony Appiah offer relevant discussion from different
standpoints. Compare APPIAH, supra note 4, at 78, 122-23, with Slovic et al., The Affect Heuristic,
supra note 24.
146. See, e.g., Judith Jarvis Thomson, IndividuatingActions, 68 J. PHIL. 774, 777 (1970). See
generally I F.M. KAMM, MORALITY, MORTALITY: DEATH AND WHOM To SAVE FROM IT 4 (1993).
147. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 724-25 (1997).
148.

See APPIAH, supra note 4.

149. lana Ritov & Jonathan Baron, Reluctance to Vaccinate: Omission Bias andAmbiguity, 3 J.
BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 263, 275 (1993).
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alongside persistent doubts about euthanasia, may be another
demonstration of the point.
Compare the dispute over two well-known problems in moral
philosophy. 150 These problems do not involve the act-omission distinction;
no omission is involved. But the problems implicate closely related
concerns. The first, called the trolley problem, asks people to suppose that a
runaway trolley is headed for five people, who will be killed if the trolley
continues on its current course. The question is whether you would throw a
switch that would move the trolley onto another set of tracks, killing one
person rather than five. Most people would throw the switch. The second,
called the footbridge problem, is the same as that just given, but with one
difference: the only way to save the five is to throw a stranger, now on a
footbridge that spans the tracks, into the path of the trolley, killing that
stranger but preventing the trolley from reaching the others. Most people
will not kill the stranger; in fact they are indignant at the suggestion that
they ought to do so. But what is the difference between the two cases, if
any? A great deal of philosophical work has been done on this question,
much of it trying to suggest that our firm intuitions can indeed be defended
in principle.' 51
Without engaging these arguments, let us suggest the possibility of a
simpler answer. 5 2 As a matter of principle, there may or may not be a
difference between the two cases. But people's different reactions are based
on automatic moral intuitions that condemn the throwing of the stranger but
support the throwing of the switch. As a matter of intuition, it is worse to
throw a human being in the path of a trolley than to throw a switch that
(indirectly?) leads to a death. People also struggle heroically, and by
reference to System 2, to rescue their intuitions and to establish that the two
cases are genuinely different in principle, whether or not this is so. But
System 1, and indignation about brutal acts of commission, are responsible
for the underlying intuitions.
Consider a suggestive experiment designed to see how the human brain
responds to the two problems.'5 3 The authors do not attempt to answer the
moral questions in principle, but they find "that there are systematic
variations in the engagement of emotion in moral judgment," and that brain
areas associated with emotion are far more active in contemplating the
150. See Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Trolley Problem, in RIGHTS, RESTITUTION, AND RISK 94116 (William Parent ed., 1986).
151. See id. See also Philippa Foot, The Problem ofAbortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect,
5 OXFORD REv. 5, 12-14 (1967).
152. A detailed discussion can be found in Greene, The Secret Joke, supra note 2, at 41-46.
153. Joshua D. Greene et al., An JMR1 Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral
Judgment, 293 SCIENCE 2105, 2106 (2001).
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footbridge problem than in contemplating the trolley problem. 54 An
implication of the authors' finding is that human brains are hard-wired to
distinguish between bringing about a death "up close and personal" and
doing so at a distance. 155 It follows that acts, especially brutal acts, would
be far more likely to produce reactions from the brain areas associated with
emotions than omissions that cause identical harms.
A related study finds that certain forms of brain damage, dampening
the social emotions, lead people to accept utilitarian approaches to certain
problems, and to reject deontological inclinations that help distinguish
between the trolley problem and the footbridge problem. 56 Patients with
damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPC) show reduced
emotional sensitivity and reduced social emotions, such as compassion,
shame, and guilt. Such patients were asked to resolve certain moral
dilemmas, including the trolley and the footbridge problems, and other
problems asking whether one person should be sacrificed to save several. A
control group, consisting of people without VMPC damage, produced the
normal responses, with considerable skepticism about utilitarian balancing.
By contrast, the VMPC patients were far more likely to be willing to
sacrifice one person for the benefit of a larger number.
The authors conclude that VMPC patients, lacking "an emotional
reaction" to the relevant harm, are more willing to "rely on explicit norms
endorsing the maximization of aggregate welfare.' 57 It is possible to
understand this finding as a demonstration that when System 1 is damaged,
58
people will rely on System 2, which leads in the direction of welfarism.'
Compare the case of fear, where an identifiable region of the brain
makes helpfully immediate but not entirely reliable judgments, 59 in a way
that suggests a possible physical location for some of the operations of
System 1. In the context of risk-related judgments, similar findings have
been made, in a way that suggests that those with brain damage can actually
do far better in investment decisions. 160 Putting the normative issues to one
side, we think that something analogous is true in the context of morality,
politics, and law.' 61 A clear implication involves moral numbness: many
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id.at2107.
Id.at2106.
See Koenigs et al., supra note 22, at908.
Id. at 910.

158. This understanding is defended in Joshua D. Greene, Why Are VMPFC Patients More
Utilitarian?A Dual-Process Theory of Moral Judgment Explains, 11 TRENDS COGNITIVE Sci. 322,
322 (2007).
159. See LEDoux,supranote 22,at163-65.
160. See Baba Shiv et al., Investment Behavior and the Negative Side of Emotion, 16 PSYCHOL.
ScI. 435, 436-37 (2005).
161. See generally Greene & Haidt, supranote 2,at522.
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acts and even more omissions do not trigger indignation on the part of
System 1, but might well be subject to moral criticism from the standpoint
of System 2, if only it can become or be made sufficiently active.
Consider in this regard the "identifiable victim effect."' 6 2 People will
devote substantial resources to save an identifiable victim, and they will be
indignant at the failure to make large efforts to assist such a victim. By
contrast, "statistical victims" or large groups of nameless people, at serious
risk from some harm, often occasion little attention or concern. 63 A
potentially beneficial function of some practices, such as cost-benefit
analysis, is to bring a System 2 check to bear, ensuring that statistical victims
receive serious attention even if people are not indignant about their plight.'64
I have not suggested that System 2 generally outperforms System 1.
People's automatic judgments might be quite good from the moral point of
view, 16 and the judgments yielded by System 2 might be erroneous or
worse. But in some domains, the intuitive system is likely to be activated
when there is little justification for indignation, and to be passive in the face
of serious suffering. A potential virtue of institutional safeguards, including
efforts to ensure some kind of accounting of actual consequences, is to
provide a deliberative
check in cases in which System 1 reacts excessively
166
all.
at
or not
CONCLUSION

Moral intuitions operate in much the same way as other intuitions do;
what makes the moral domain distinctive is its frequent foundation in the
emotions, beliefs, and response tendencies that define indignation. System 1
is typically responsible for indignation; System 2 may or may not provide
an override. Moral dumbfounding and moral numbness are often a product
of moral intuitions that people are unable to justify. Both of these have
consequences for public policy and law. Thus, for example, some legal
outcomes and prohibitions are rooted in automatic, intensely held intuitions
that people find hard to justify. Individual and collective inaction, in the
face of widespread suffering and distress, often persists because System 1 is
difficult to activate. 1 67 A large task is to produce institutional safeguards to
162. See, e.g., Jenni & Loewenstein, supranote 16, at 236.
163. See Slovic, supra note 15, at 86; Lisa Heinzerling, The Rights of Statistical People, 24
HARV. ENvT,. L. REV. 189, 189-90 (2000).

164. See Allan Gibbard, Risk and Value, in VALUES AT RISK 94 (Douglas MacLean ed., 1986).
165. An argument to this effect can be found in GERD GIGERENZER, GUT FEELINGS: THE
INTELLIGENCE OF THE UNCONSCIOUS (2007).

166. Slovic, supra note 15, at 82-88.
167. Id.
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ensure against the risk that legal and political outcomes will respond to
unjustifiably intense indignation, or that democratic societies will remain
passive simply because the relevant harms are not of the sort that stir
System 1.
An understanding of indignation helps to explain the operation of the
outrage heuristic, the centrality of harm, the severity shift, the role of
reference states, moral framing, and the use of the act-omission distinction.
And because of the nature of indignation, it is extremely difficult for people
to achieve coherence in their moral intuitions; the problem of incoherence
besets legal outcomes as well, in the areas ofjury awards and administrative
penalties. A general implication is that people are sometimes unaware of the
causes of their moral judgments, which may stem from System 1 rather than
System 2. So too judges, and others involved in law, may be quite oblivious
to the causes of the moral judgments that underlie their legal conclusions,
and may sincerely but mistakenly believe that their ex post explanations
were causal.
The intuitions described here play an important role in multiple
domains, including families, labor unions, workplaces, student groups,
sporting events, and religious organizations. But as many of the examples
suggest, they also influence the decisions of legal and political institutions.
Such institutions are usually intended to be deliberative, to override errorprone intuitions, and to pay close attention to System 2; but even in the most
deliberative institutions, System 1 can make some compelling demands.
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